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Abstract:  
Public policy making on asylum takes place in an environment of intense public scrutiny, 
strong institutional constraints and international collective action problems.  By assessing the 
relative importance of key pull factors of international migration, this article explains why, 
even when controlling for their differences in size, some states receive a much larger number 
of asylum seekers than others.  The analysis of 20 OECD countries for the period 1985-1999 
further shows that some of the most high profile public policy measures—safe third country 
provisions, dispersal and voucher schemes—aimed, at least in part, at deterring unwanted 
migration and at addressing the highly unequal distribution of asylum burdens have often 
been ineffective.  This is because the key determinants of an asylum seeker’s choice of host 
country are historical, economic and reputational factors that largely lie beyond the reach of 
asylum policy makers.  Finally, the paper argues that the effectiveness of unilateral policy 
measures will be further undermined by multilateral attempts to harmonise restrictive policies 
and that current efforts such as those by the European Union will consolidate, rather than 
effectively address, existing disparities in the distribution of asylum burdens. 








In an increasingly interdependent world, rising numbers of asylum 
seekers and their highly unequal distribution across countries have meant 
that forced migration is now regarded as one of the key challenges facing 
nation states today.2 This challenge is made even greater by the fact that 
one state’s policy decisions on the relative leniency or restrictiveness of its 
asylum regime will create externalities for other states and can thus lead 
to strained relations between states.3 As a consequence, forced migration 
has also come to be seen as a crucial challenge for international policy 
coordination, leading, for example, to rapid advances in the efforts of the 
European Union to provide for solutions in this area.  
 
Policy makers charged with finding an appropriate response to these 
challenges have been faced with two key questions: First, why have some 
states been faced with a much higher number of asylum applications than 
other states. And second, what public policy measures can effectively 
influence the number of asylum seekers that a state receives? From a 
national perspective, the most frequent response to the first question has 
been to argue that if states’ asylum burden is disproportionate, then these 
countries’ asylum procedures are probably too lenient and their welfare 
provisions too generous in international comparison. By increasing the 
restrictiveness of their asylum policy, the argument goes, states will be 
                                                 
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 98th American Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, Boston, 29 August – 1 September 2002.  The author is 
grateful for comments and suggestions received, in particular from Fabio Franchino, 
Simon Hix, Torun Dewan and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. 
2 The largest part of the world’s 15 million asylum seekers in 2001 sought refuge in 
developing countries.  However, since the early 1980s the number of asylum seekers in 
Europe has increased almost tenfold to 970.000 in 2001.  In the period between 1985 and 
1999, Switzerland as the largest recipient of asylum seekers on average relative to its 
population size, was faced with 30 percent more asylum applications than Sweden, 40 
percent more than Germany, 6 times as many as France and the UK, 30 times as many 
as Italy and 300 times as many as Portugal and Sweden (UNHCR 1999). 
3 Recent examples are the currently strained relations between Denmark and Sweden 
following the introduction of highly restrictive asylum measures by the new conservative 
government in Denmark and the controversy about the Sangatte refugee camp which 
soured relations between France and Britain.  
  3
able to redress the inequitable distribution of burdens, raising concerns in 
some quarters about a possible race to the bottom of protection standards. 
However, there has so far been no academic attempt to use relevant 
theoretical models developed in the field of economic migration (Ranis and 
Fei, 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970; Borjas 1990; Massey et al. 1993) to 
systematically analyse patterns of asylum flows in order to establish the 
importance of policy and other historical, economic or political migration 
pull factors that can explain why asylum seekers apply in a particular 
country. 
 
Regarding the second question, on the capacity of public policy in this 
area, there is still little consensus as to whether liberal states can control 
unwanted migration (Freeman 1994). The ‘transnationalist’ strand of the 
literature (Sassen 1996; Jacobson 1995; Soysal 1994) emphasises systemic 
constraints that undermine the capacity of states to assert effective 
control in this area. In contrast, the more ‘state-centrist’ strand of the 
literature (Holzer, Schneider and Widmer 2000; Guiraudon and Lahav 
2000; Joppke 1997; 1998) argues that states have found new ways to 
regulate migration in an era of increasing interdependence, which enables 
them to retain much of their regulatory capacity in this area, even to the 
extent that their measures have undermined some of the more liberal 
aspects of the international migration regime.  
 
Largely missing from the literature have been quantitative studies that 
systematically analyse empirical evidence across time and space4 and 
which might offer more conclusive answers about the determinants of 
asylum seekers’ choice of destination country and the effectiveness of 
public policy in regulating asylum flows. In an attempt to fill this gap, this 
paper analyses UNHCR and OECD data from 20 OECD countries for the 
period 1985-1999 and shows many public policy measures aimed, at least 
in part, at deterring unwanted migration and at addressing the highly 
                                                 
4 One notable exception is the study by Holzer and Schneider (2002).  
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unequal distribution of asylum burdens have remained ineffective. The 
paper argues that this is because the key determinants of an asylum 
seeker’s choice of host country are historical, economic and reputational 
factors that largely lie beyond the reach of asylum policy makers. It also 
suggests that the effectiveness of unilateral policy measures will be 
further undermined by multilateral attempts to harmonise restrictive 
policies and that current efforts such as those by the European Union 
consolidate, rather than effectively address, existing disparities in the 
distribution of asylum burdens.  
 
To make this argument the paper proceeds as follows: After a short 
overview of recent public policy responses, an analysis of the theoretical 
literature on migration will identify theoretically informed pull factors. 
From this, the paper will generate a number of hypotheses. The next part 
develops and explains the model which is subsequently used to test the 
hypotheses empirically based on data for 20 OECD countries over the 
period 1986-1999. The final section discusses the empirical results which 
call into question some widely held assumptions about the underlying 
reasons for the unequal distribution of 'asylum burdens' and the 
effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral deterrence measures. 
 
 
2. Setting the Scene: Forced Migration and Public Policy 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the issue of immigration and asylum has gained 
considerable prominence in OECD countries. The combination of 
heightened migration pressure and reduced willingness to accept inward 
migration, has pushed the issue towards the top of the political agenda. As 
economic and political uncertainties increased in the 1990s, public opinion 
(often encouraged by electioneering politicians and a xenophobic media)5 
                                                 
5 The words "floodgates", "swamped", "scroungers", "soft touch" and "bogus" are 
frequently used by newspapers (and at times by politicians) in the context of asylum 
policy.  Take the following examples from newspaper headlines in the UK: "Our land is  
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became more and more wary about inward migration, which in turn 
produced more pressure on politicians for "decisive" action in this area. 
The important distinction between economic and forced migration often 
threatened to be lost in the process. Although states are generally free to 
decide on the number of economic migrants they are willing to accept, in 
the area of forced migration international obligations such as the Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refugees impose important obligations on 
states. However, this is not to dispute the fact that, with the door to legal 
immigration shut in most states since the early 1970s, a significant 
number of economic migrants have taken the 'asylum route' as it has often 
constituted the only remaining avenue for third country nationals to 
legally settle in one of the OECD countries. In the 1990s, asylum 
applications therefore became a primary concern for policy makers in all 
OECD states. Figure 1 shows that the number of asylum applications filed 
in the developed world increased significantly in the late 1980s and early 
1990. 
 















However, policy-makers are not just concerned about the growth in the 
                                                                                                                                            
being swamped by a flood of fiddlers stretching our resources—and our patience—to 
breaking point" (The Sun); "Hello Mr Sponger… Need Any Benefits?" (Daily Star, 
26/04/2002). "Scandal of how it costs nearly as much to keep an asylum seeker as a room 
at the Ritz" (The Mail); " …we resent the scroungers, beggars and crooks who are 
prepared to cross every country in Europe to reach our generous benefits system" (The 
Sun, 07/03/2001).  
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absolute numbers of asylum applications, over which they have only 
limited influence given a volatile international system and their 
international obligations. They are also concerned about the relative 
distribution of asylum applications among states, in particular when they 
feel that the policy measures adopted in neighbouring states are at least 
in part responsible for their own asylum burden. When analysing the 
development of asylum applications across OECD countries, it soon 
becomes clear that the distribution of asylum applications has been highly 
unbalanced. Public attention was drawn to this in when in 1992 Germany 
received over 438.000 asylum applications, which constituted 66 percent of 
all applications registered in the territory which now make up European 
Union.6  
 
However, a focus on absolute figures might well be misleading. When 
using the more meaningful measure of relative burdens, i.e. one which 
takes account of differences in reception capacity,7 the unevenness in 
distribution becomes even clearer (see Table 1). It can be shown that since 
the mid 1980s some European countries, most notably Switzerland 
Sweden and Germany, have borne a much higher relative (per capita) 
burden than the EU average. This inequitable balance of burdens has 
constituted a considerable domestic challenge in some countries. It has 
also led to tensions between some OECD countries, particularly within the 
EU, as there was a feeling in some quarters that certain countries were 
introducing unilateral deterrence measures to deflect asylum applications 
towards other countries.  
 
 
                                                 
6 UNHCR data. 
7  There are several possible criteria to measure reception capacity, the most common one 
being relative population size (per capita).   
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Table 1: Average Number of Asylum Applications per Year, 1985-99 
  (per thousand of population) 
 
HIGHEST       LOWEST   
Switzerland  3.35 Belgium  1.41 Australia  0.36 Spain  0.17 
Sweden  2.64 Norway  1.23 Ireland  0.33 Czech Rep.  0.16 
Germany  2.03 Canada  0.97 Greece  0.31 Italy  0.15 
Denmark  1.81 EU15  0.96 US  0.28 Portugal  0.05 
Netherlands  1.63 France  0.55 Finland  0.24 Poland  0.03 
Austria  1.62 UK  0.46 Hungary  0.19 Japan  0 
 
 
Against the background of the serious collective action problems involved 
in this area, the German government in 1992 proposed a European wide 
asylum burden-sharing system. The German proposal8 foresaw the 
distribution of asylum seekers across Europe according to indicative 
figures that were based on a distribution key composed of three criteria 
which were given equal weight (population size, size of Member State 
territory and GDP).9 The centrepiece of the German draft was the 
introduction of a compulsory resettlement mechanism which would have 
worked as follows: ‘Where the numbers admitted by a Member State 
exceeds its indicative figure [...], other Member States which have not yet 
reached their indicative figure [...] will accept persons from the first 
State’.10 This proposal, however, did not find the necessary support among 
other countries, with the UK in particular being strongly opposed to such 
a scheme.11  
 
Since then, European states have instead agreed on a number of (limited) 
steps towards harmonising asylum policy regulations across Europe, 
                                                 
8 Council Document 7773/94 ASIM 124. 
9 The form of the suggested redistributive mechanism followed the example of German 
domestic legislation, which stipulates a similar key for the distribution of asylum seekers 
among the German Länder.  See section 45 of the German Asylum Procedure Act 
(Asylverfahrensgesetz). 
10 Council Document 7773/94 ASIM 124. 
11 BMI, Pressemitteilung vom 1.12.1994, FAZ 27.1.1995, p.2; BT-Drs. 13/1070, 55; 
Integrationsbericht, p.92.  
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including joint visa regimes and a common refugee definition.12 At the 
same time, states have continued to undertake unilateral measures aimed 
at deterring asylum applications to their country. Such unilateral 
deterrence measures have covered the whole range of policy options 
available to policy makers in this field such as measures on access, status 
determination and those concerning the integration of asylum seekers. 
These measures have been based on a number of apparently widely held 
assumptions. First, asylum seekers are assumed to be well informed 
(either through personal networks or their traffickers) about the relative 
openness and attractiveness of different destination countries' asylum 
regimes. Second, they are expected to choose to apply to those countries 
which have the most attractive asylum policy package, in terms of access, 
determination and integration/welfare measures. In other words, 'asylum 
shopping' is being regarded as a widespread phenomenon. Finally, there 
appears to be a belief that countries with relatively more attractive 
asylum policies will come to be regarded as a 'soft touch' and will 
consequently have to cope with a disproportionately high number of 
asylum applications. Despite the fact that these assumptions are at least 
questionable, they have formed the basis for the introduction of unilateral 
deterrence measures which have come to be viewed by both policy-makers 
(and many academics) as being highly effective. For example, the dramatic 
reduction in the number of applications received by Germany between 
1992 and 1994 has widely been attributed to the 1993 restrictions that 
were introduced to the German Basic Law and the legislation pertaining 
to foreigners. The adoption of so called 'safe third country provisions' in 
particular has been regarded as being highly effective as it has enabled 
German border guards to refuse certain categories of asylum seekers entry 
to German territory.13 The 71 percent drop in asylum applications in 
                                                 
12 For a comprehensive discussion see Noll (2000). 
13 "Safe third country" provisions mean that asylum seekers are denied access to the 
refugee status determination procedure on the grounds that they could or should have 
requested and, if qualified, would actually have been granted asylum in another country.  
In practice this means that asylum seekers who have travelled through other countries 
before reaching their destination will not have their asylum application examined in the  
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Germany between 1992 and 1994 has often been attributed to these 
restrictive changes.14 
 
Some more recent single-country research results (Holzer, Schneider and 
Widmer 2000; Robinson and Segrott 2002), however, have cautioned 
against being overly confident about the effectiveness of asylum policy in 
steering migration flows. The quantitative analysis of the Swiss case 
showed that Switzerland only within limits has been able to influence the 
inflow of asylum seekers between 1986 and 1995. The study showed that 
the Swiss government was partly successful in manipulating the relative 
number of refugees it recognized to achieve its deterrence objectives. 
However, the study concluded that deterrence measures can be expected 
to be unsuccessful 'if the push factors in a region nearby to the receiving 
states reach a critical level' (Holzer, Schneider and Widmer 2000: 1205). 
Research conducted in the UK draws even more sceptical conclusions. The 
research that was based on 65 interviews with asylum seekers found that 
most of the respondents knew very little about UK asylum policy before 
their arrival. The study found that they certainly did not have sufficient 
knowledge to make an informed choice based on rational evaluation of 
reception conditions and welfare benefits on offer by several possible 
destination countries (Robinson and Segrott 2002: 46; 63).  
 
These studies, as other research on patterns of asylum seeking in Europe, 
suffer from their focus on individual countries which makes generalisation 
difficult. Moreover, qualitative research based on survey data, whereby 
asylum seekers are asked about their travel route, their preferences as to 
particular countries of destinations and why they applied in a particular 
country can be problematic. Although, qualitative analyses based on large-
scales sample have a strong appeal (who else than the asylum seeker 
                                                                                                                                            
country of their choice but will be returned to the other country (Hailbronner 1993; 
Kjaergaard 1994). 
14 Later in this paper it will be shown, however, that attributing the drop mainly to 
changes in German asylum policy is highly questionable.  
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knows why s/he applied in a particular country), research of this kind 
suffers from two difficulties in particular. First, survey analyses of the 
required kind is very costly especially when one is interested in systematic 
comparative analyses across countries (let alone over time). Interviews are 
especially costly because they often have to rely on interpreters. Second, 
and potentially even more problematic, is the fact that asylum seekers 
might have a strong incentive to emphasise certain determinants over 
others, as they know that certain answers might compromise their asylum 
application or residence status.15 It is for these reasons that the 
systematic quantitative analysis in this paper, despite its own limitations, 
will make a contribution to the existing literature.16 
 
 
3. Which Host Country? Migration Theory and Pull Factors 
 
Although still an under-theorised area of study, one can identify a number 
of prominent theories and models of international migration (Kritz et al. 
1992, Massey et al. 1993, Meyers 2000). One of the most commonly known 
theoretical migration models is the so-called push-pull model. In its most 
abstract form, the push-pull model suggests that there are push factors in 
countries of origin that cause people to leave their country, and positive or 
pull factors that attract migrants to a receiving country. Although this 
model cannot simply be transferred to the area of forced migration,17 it 
                                                 
15 This problem is certainly confounded when the research in funded by the national body 
which determines asylum cases, as was the case in the above study by Robinson and 
Segrott which was financed by the UK Home Office. 
16 Problems with quantitative data analysis stem from the aggregation of data and 
difficulties stemming from the incongruence of national definitions.  For an extensive 
discussion see e.g. Crisp (1999) and the chapter on 'Sources and Comparability of 
Migration Statistics'; in: OECD (SOPEMI) (2002: 269-73). 
17 In the area of forced migration pull factors are not assumed to be the driving forced 
behind persons leaving their country and push factors are often assumed to be limited to 
persecution of the kind listed in the Geneva Convention (UN Convention on the Status of 
Refugees 1951, as amended by the 1967 New York Protocol).  The Convention defines a 
refugee as a person who "owing to a well–founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country".  Refugees must therefore be seen as 
distinct from economically motivated labour migrants, as the former move involuntarily,  
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still offers a number of insights for research on the direction of asylum 
flows. In a similar vein, and of specific interest to this paper, the idea of 
pull factors is used in the area of forced migration, to explain the patterns 
of asylum applications across different possible destination countries. The 
analysis of such pull factors will help us explain the direction of forced 
migration flows, an issue that has so far been a widely neglected aspect of 
migration research. A review of the theoretical literature on migration,18 
produces five categories of pull-factors—economic, historic, political, 




Economic theories of migration have only limited applicability in the area 
of forced migration, in which displaced persons often will have little or no 
time for deliberations of 'utility maximisation'. However, despite the 
important substantive differences between economic and forced migration, 
economic considerations can still be expected to play a role in the area of 
forced migration. Like other migrants, asylum seekers will often face 
financial and other constraints which will influence their choice (limited 
as it might be). In many cases even forced migrants will have some choice 
as to their country of destination and can therefore be expected to take 
economic consideration into account. Moreover, we do of course know 
(Kunz 1981; Zolberg et al. 1995) that in a world of high cross-country 
income differentials and highly restrictive admission policies, persecution 
is not the only push factor behind the large number of asylum applications 
of recent years. Given the above, economic factors must be included when 
analysing the incidence of asylum applications across the OECD.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
while for the latter there is an element of choice in their migration decision.  In practice, 
such classifications are less clear than often assumed, as political and economic causes 
frequently join forces in producing movement, and freedom of choice is rarely absolute 
and might be limited in both types of migration. 
18 One objective of this review of the general theoretical literature on migration is to 
analyse to what extent hypotheses derived from this literature (that deals primarily with 
economic migration) can be usefully extended to the area of forced migration.  
  12
Neo-classical economic migration theory (Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and 
Todaro 1970, Todaro 1976) explains the decision to migrate as one of 
income maximisation in which wealth differentials and differences in 
employment opportunities constitute important pull factors. International 
migration is expected to be determined by geographic differences in the 
supply and demand of labour. Ultimately, in this view, it is wage 
differentials which can explain movements from low-wage countries to 
high-wage countries. In it micro-economic extension (Sjaastad, 1962; 
Borjas 1990), rational actors (be it individuals or larger units such as 
families or households) decide to migrate in the expectation of a positive, 
often monetary, net return from migration. In this framework, the decisive 
factor is income differentials as well as the probability of employment in 
the destination country. In other words migration decisions can be seen as 
being guided by processes of income maximisation and risk minimisation.  
 
 
Historical Ties, Networks & Path Dependency 
Historical ties between countries of origin and destination countries often 
lead to transport, trade and communication links which tend to facilitate 
movements of people from one country to the other. Material links are 
often accompanied by ideological or cultural links. Colonial legacies often 
explain why administrative and educational systems in third world 
countries mirror those of a past colonial power and often continue to be 
reflected in migration flows long after independence (Fassmann and 
Muenz 1992). For example, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis learn English, 
are raised in a British-style education system and keep up links with the 
UK through the Commonwealth. Language ties, communication links and 
cultural networks that are responsible for the diffusion of particular 
consumption patterns, can be responsible for channeling international 
migration to particular destination countries (Massey et al., 1993: 446-7).  
 
Moreover, the fact that migrant or refugee communities have been  
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established in certain destination countries as a result of historic ties, will 
often lead to the growth of migrant networks that may foster future 
migration flows. Such networks are sets of interpersonal ties between 
earlier migrants already resident in a destination country and potential 
migrants in countries of origin that are based on family ties, friendships or 
shared community origin. Such ties can significantly reduce the costs and 
risks of migration, thus channelling migration flows in the direction of 
earlier migration flows. By passing on information about access to a 
particular country and its employment opportunities, they constitute a 
form of social capital (Hugo, 1981; Taylor, 1986). Once migration 
connections have been established, the presence of relatives, friends, 
and/or others from the same community of origin may form a strong 
incentive to choose a particular destination. Migration may thus be seen 
as a self-sustaining diffusion process (Massey et al. 1993), which 
governments will find difficult to control. 
 
Following the same line of reasoning we could also expect a certain degree 
of path-dependency from one period of migration to the next. Such a 
process is likely to be the result of two dynamics. First, there will be a 
reduction of costs and risks for migrants as they can rely on the support of 
personal networks. Second, there will be certain persistence of existing 
migration routes and patterns, as agents and traffickers will have 
incurred sunk costs by investing in the creation of networks which they 
will be reluctant to give up (Pierson 2000). 
 
 
Political Values ('Liberalness') 
Concerns about personal security and their acceptance into a new host 
society can be expected to be important considerations for potential 
migrants, in particular forced migrants who are leaving their country of 
origin because of concerns about their, or their family's, safety. The 
reputation of a country in terms of its 'liberal credentials' as well as its  
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track record on issues such as adherence to human rights standards, 
international humanitarian crises, community relations, reception and 
integration of foreigners, naturalisation policies and the like, can be 
expected to play a role in a migrant's consideration about the relative 
attractiveness of countries of destination.  
 
Geography 
Ease of access, in particular geographic proximity, between a country of 
origin and a country of destination can also be expected to be a pull factor 
in migration patterns. Despite technological developments which have 
made geographic distance less of an issue than it was in the past, most 
migrants' resources are limited and smaller distances will often mean 
lower costs of transport and hence easier access. In other words, 
geographic distance can often be regarded as a proxy for the costs of 
movement. Although other factors, such as length and relative openness of 
countries' territorial borders, will also play a role as to how accessible a 
country of destination is for migrants, geographic distance can be expected 
to constitute an important consideration. We can also expect an 
interaction with other pull factors already discussed. Although geographic 
proximity does not guarantee the establishment of cross border ties, 




States often regard asylum burdens as a 'zero sum' phenomenon, in which 
a reduction of one country's burden will result in increasing burdens for 
other countries. The assumption is that there is a certain number of 
migrants each year who intend to claim asylum and that the role of 
national asylum policy is to restrict the inflow into a particular country to 
an acceptable proportion. This means that policy makers will try to use 
migration policy instruments to make sure that their country will not be 
seen as a 'soft touch', i.e. an overly attractive destination country that will 
attract an unacceptable proportion of asylum seekers. Three sets of such  
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instruments in particular are at their disposal: (1) access control, (2) the 
determination process and (3) migrant integration policy. Access control 
policy refers to the rules and procedures governing the admission of 
foreign nationals and its instruments include visa policy, regulations for 
carriers, safe third country provisions, etc. Rules concerning 
determination procedures relate to entry into a country's refugee 
recognition system, appeal rights, and rules concerning protection that is 
subsidiary to the rather narrowly defined Geneva Convention criteria for 
full refugee status.19 Finally, integration policy is concerned with rights 
and benefits given to asylum seekers inside a country of destination (e.g. 
work and housing conditions, rules on freedom of movement, welfare 
provisions, educational opportunities, etc.). Policy-makers can introduce 
changes in the regulations in these three areas in an attempt to raise the 
deterrence effect of their policy, which in turn is expected to make their 
country less attractive to asylum seekers in relative terms.  
 
The various above explanations of pull-factors for migrants and in 
particular asylum seekers, are obviously not mutually exclusive. On their 
own, as well as in combination, they can be expected to help explain why 
asylum seekers apply for asylum more in some OECD countries than in 
others. Individuals might engage in cost-benefit calculations that make 
them choose richer countries with more employment opportunities over 
poorer ones with fewer work opportunities; they might try to reduce risks 
and costs by using existing networks; that might prefer a more liberal 
country of destination over a less liberal one; they might be more likely to 
end up in a country that is relatively closer to their country of origin; and 
finally their decision might be affected by the relative asylum policy-mix of 
different potential countries of destination. The purpose of this paper is 
not to examine necessarily competing theories but to test the relative 
strength of hypotheses that can be drawn from the above discussion of 
different possible pull factors. 
                                                 






To do this, the paper uses time-series cross-section of aggregated data for 
20 OECD countries for the period 1985 to 1999 collected from UNHCR, 
OECD and the U.S. Committee for Refugees.20 This quantitative analysis 
allows the testing of hypotheses regarding the existence and relative 
strength of the different potential pull-factors. In doing so, the paper will 
control for particular country and time effects such as differences in 
reception capacity and fluctuations of the absolute number of asylum 




When looking at the issue of asylum from an international 'burden-
sharing' perspective, it is more interesting to focus on the number of 
relative asylum applications (i.e. applications per capita) across time and 
place, than on the absolute numbers of applications which has tended to 
dominate the public debate on asylum. Relative figures are the crucial 
reference figures if states want to check the success of failure of their 
attempt to achieve a more equitable distribution of burdens as a result of 
international co-operation. Also, it is also hardly surprising (nor 
objectionable) that in absolute terms, larger countries will tend to attract 
more inward migration than smaller countries. This paper therefore seeks 
to explain the number of asylum-applications in each country and for each 
year of the data set, relative to the population of each of these countries 
while controlling for variations in the number of total applications and 
overall population growth across all the OECD countries included in the 
                                                 
20 Due to missing data, the US, Canada and Australia have as yet not been able to be 
added to the data-set.  However, they are expected to be included for the final version of 
this paper.   
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dataset.21 To calculate the dependent variable, I used the annual UNHCR 
statistics of asylum applications and OECD data on population 
developments. To arrive at the observations for my dependent variable for 
each country and each year I divided the number of asylum applications 
by the country’s population size and put this figure is relation to the total 





The explanatory variables are constructed in such a way as to allow for 
the examination of the five above theories on key pull-factors for asylum 
applications.  
 
First, to test for economic pull factors, the paper analyses OECD data on 
annual GDP growth (in percent) and the total number of registered 
unemployed. The expectation is that a country's relative burden will be 
positively correlated with its economic performance and negatively with 
its numbers of unemployed.  
 
Second, to test the importance of geographic factors, I determine the 
average distance between the capital of a destination country and the 
                                                 
21 Asylum applications per population is the most commonly accepted way of analysing 
relative burdens in this area.  Controlling for GNP, instead of population size, leads to an 
almost identical ranking order in terms of relative burdens.  As this analysis here is 
interested in explaining the distribution of relative asylum burdens over time, it does not 
seek to assess the role of push-factors responsible for variations in absolute asylum-
applications. 













, = ,  
whereby the term B represents the relative number of asylum applications received in 
country i in year t; a stands for the absolute number of asylum applications received in 
country i in year t; p for the population of country i in year t; A for the sum total number 
of asylum applications received across all OECD countries in the dataset in year t and P 
represents the sum total population figure of all OECD countries in the dataset in year t.  
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capitals of the top five countries of origin in each year.23 The expectation is 
that countries of destination which are geographically closer to the top five 
countries of origin in any particular year will attract relatively more 
asylum-seekers.  
 
Third, to test the role played by a country's liberal reputation, I used 
overseas development aid (OECD data measured in million $) as a proxy 
variable for a country's 'liberalness'. I expect a more liberal country (i.e. 
one with relatively high ODA/GDP ration) to attract a relatively high 
number of asylum seekers.  
 
Fourth, to test network/historic ties theories, I add (at t-1) the stock of 
foreign population from the top five asylum countries (at time t). The 
expectation is that countries with an already relatively large stock of 
foreign nationals from the main countries from which asylum seekers are 
originating in a particular year, will receive a relatively greater number of 
applications in relation to their size.  
 
Finally, to analyse the importance and the effectiveness of 
asylum/deterrence policy measures I use a deterrence index fluctuating 
between 0 (lowest deterrent effect) to 5 (highest deterrent effect). To 
calculate the index, I analysed two sets of annual yearbooks, the OECD's 
'Trends in International Migration' (SOPEMI) and the US Committee for 
Refugees' 'World Refugee Survey' for the years 1984-1999. Each describes 
and analyses developments in national asylum policy measures for each 
country in the paper's data set.  
 
Five measures in particular stand out that have been widely regarded by 
policy makers as having the potential to significantly influence an asylum 
                                                 
23 To do this I used a programme developed by John A. Byers which can be accessed at 
http://www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/moregen.htm.  
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seeker's decision as to which country to apply to (UK Home Office 2002).24 
First, in the area of access control, arguably the most important measure 
was the introduction of so called 'safe third country' provisions, which 
mean that persons seeking asylum will be refused entry into a country, if 
on their way to this country they travelled though another state which the 
first country regards as safe and in which the asylum seeker could have 
applied for asylum. If an asylum seeker's travel route only transpires in 
the course of the determination procedure, he or she can be sent back to 
the 'safe third country'. The introduction of 'safe third country provisions' 
across Europe meant that asylum seekers travelling 'overland' to Europe 
were no longer able to legitimately claim asylum in the country of their 
destination, as the responsibility for their case was shifted on a 
neighbouring country through which they had travelled. To account for the 
introduction of safe third country provisions, I created a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 for each year that safe third country provisions 
were applied in a country and the value 0 for all other years. 
 
Second, with respect to a country's determination procedures, the most 
important potential pull factors that can be influenced by national policy-
makers are the rules concerning the granting of subsidiary protection 
status which allows an asylum seeker to remain in a country of 
destination even though their application for full refugee status under the 
Geneva Convention is refused. Destination countries have complete 
discretion in defining the requirements that protection seekers have to 
fulfil to be awarded such subsidiary status which means that within 
Europe the percentage of asylum seekers allowed to stay in a country on 
the basis of the award of some protection status varies from single figures 
to over 70 percent (UNHCR 1999). Again, I have created a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if a country of destination is below the 
                                                 
24 Other relevant indicators such as a countries' detention and deportation rates, their 
visa requirements, their readmission agreements with third countries have not yet been 
included in the index for lack of comparative data.  However, these measure are expected 
to positively correlate with the other indicators used here and their omission is there not 
expected to significantly distort the results.  
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average with regard to the percentage of asylum seekers it allows to stay 
in its country in a particular year and which takes the value 0 if the 
percentage of protection seekers allowed to stay is above the OECD 
average. 
 
Finally, much of the discussion of the past few years has focused on the 
potential pull-effects entailed in a third category of asylum policy, namely 
that of integration measures for asylum seekers. Here three policy aspects 
are often regarded as being crucial: first, freedom of movement vs. a 
compulsory dispersal policy; second, cash welfare payments vs. a system of 
vouchers; and third, the right to work under certain conditions vs. a 
general prohibition to take up employment as an asylum seeker. The first 
of these concerns the right of asylum seekers to move freely within their 
country of destination until their asylum claim has been determined. 
While a federal state such as Germany has always had central reception 
centres from which asylum seekers are be dispersed to the different 
Länder according to their relative population size, some unitary states—
most notably the UK—have recently introduced similar measures. 
Although dispersal measures first and foremost are an attempt to 
alleviate pressures from particular (usually metropolitan) areas which are 
faced with a strong concentration of asylum seekers, such measures are 
also hoped to deter unfounded asylum claims. Second, the 'cash' payment 
of welfare benefits cash rather than a payment 'in kind' or through a 
voucher system has sometimes been regarded as a pull-factor for asylum 
seekers.25 This has led a number of OECD countries to stop giving asylum 
seekers cash benefits and to replace cash payments by the direct provision 
of housing, food and health care. In 1999, the UK and Ireland introduced a 
voucher system for asylum seekers, despite the fact that the two 
governments were advised that such a system would be more costly to 
                                                 
25 The British government, for example, resisted pressures to abolish the UK’s voucher 
scheme.  Government advisors warned that ‘re-introducing cash benefits would create a 
“pull factor” for thousands more asylum seekers’ (‘Details of Blunkett’s asylum shake up’, 
The Guardian, 7 February 2002).  
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administer than a cash-based system.26 However, governments have been 
attracted to vouchers due to the deterrent effect that has sometimes been 
ascribed to such non-cash schemes. Finally, allowing asylum seekers to 
work while their claim to asylum status is being assessed has also 
sometimes been regarded as a potential pull factor for asylum seekers. All 
countries of destination have work restrictions for asylum seekers in 
place. However, a number of countries have gone further and now prohibit 
asylum seekers to undertake any work until their asylum claim has been 
accepted.  
 
To assess the potential deterrence effect of the above measures, three 
dummy variables were created which take the value 1 (for each year and 
country) for the existence of a dispersal scheme, a non-cash based system 
of benefits, and a law which prohibits asylum seekers to work until their 
claim has been accepted. Adding all the dummy variables for all five of the 
above potential deterrence measures for each country and each year, 
results in a country's deterrence index for a particular year.27 The 
expectation is that the higher the index for a particular country in a 
particular year, the lower that country's relative attractiveness will be and 
hence its relative burden stemming from asylum applications. Table 2 




                                                 
26 In the light of strong protests by human rights NGOs and rising costs, the UK has 
recently abandoned its voucher scheme and reintroduced the previous cash-based system. 
27 As a simplifying assumption, I take each of the five policy measure to have the same 
potential deterrence effect.  
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Table 2: Expected Relationship between variables 
 
 
Independent Variables  Dependent variable: 
Relative number of 
asylum applications 
Economic pull factors: 
  * number of registered unemployed (in t-1) 




Historical pull factors: 
  *stock of foreign nationals from top five 
  countries of origin (in t-1) 
 
+ 
Political pull factors 
  * annual ODA payments as % of GDP (in t-1) 
 
+ 
Geographic pull factors: 
  * average geographic distance between
  capital of a destination country and capitals of 
  the top five countries of origin 
 
- 
Policy related pull factors: 










To estimate the relationship between these variables and relative burdens 
for individual countries, the paper uses pooled time-series cross-section 
(TSCS) ordinary least square regressions (Stimson 1985) with panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) (Beck and Katz 1995).28 Prais-Winston 
transformations are used to eliminate serial correlation of the errors and 
to take account of cross-section and panel specific auto-correlation. In 
running the regression of the above independent variables on the number 
of relative asylum seekers, I lagged GDP growth, unemployment, foreign 
population and the deterrence index by one year as one might reasonably 
                                                 
28 'Pooled', 'panel' or 'TSCS' analysis has become a popular tool for the empirical analysis 
of issues in Comparative Politics and International Relations.  It involves the analysis of 
N cross-sections (countries) and T time periods (years).  It increases the number of 
observations available and allows for the analysis of dynamic factors in cross-national 
comparative research.  The paper corrects for expected downward bias in standard errors 
and upward bias in t-statistics (Hicks 1994) by eliminating serial correlation of the errors 
applying Beck and Katz's standard method of 'panel corrected standard errors' (PCSE).  
For a recent review on 'pooling' see Beck (2001).  
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expect that it was the performance of these indicators in t-1, and not 
current performance, that constituted a pull factor for persons applying in 
the period t.  
 
 
5. Discussion of Statistical Results 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of relative burdens as a result of asylum 
applications per 1000 of population over time in the twenty countries 
under investigation. In the majority of countries we can observe 
significant variations in relative burdens over time. We also observe that 
the relative burden of Germany over time has been comparable, and at 
times was considerably smaller, to that of some smaller countries such as 
Sweden and Switzerland. We also observe that many of the other bigger 
countries, in particular the UK, France, and Japan have attracted far 
fewer than average applications relative to their population size. Finally, 
one can observe that in a number of countries, most notably in Ireland 
Belgium, Hungary and the UK, relative applications have increased 
significantly over the past few years.  
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The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3. We find 
that some historic, economic and political pull-factors have a strong 
impact on the distribution of asylum applications. There is also evidence 
that the relative leniency or restrictiveness of a country’s asylum policy 
(expressed in the deterrence index) has a highly significant effect on the 
number of applications received. However, it will be shown below that the 
impact of the different policy measures that make up that index is highly 
varied. 
 
Table 3: Determinants for the Relative Number of Asylum Applications 
 
 Expected  Sign  Coef  z 
Number of Unemployed (lagged)  -  -.0007394 -7.49*** 
GDP growth (lagged)  +  .0023206 0.12 
Stock of Foreign Nationals (lagged)  +  .0012462 8.20*** 
 Relative ODA Payments   +  1270083 2.88*** 
Average Distance  -  0.00000382 0.08 
Deterrence Index  -  -.2266697 -2.56*** 
N=227; R-squared = 0.41; ***p<0.01 
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Economic pull factors  
As expected high unemployment figures are negatively related to relative 
numbers of asylum applications and this relationship is highly significant. 
While some displaced persons will have little or no choice where they end 
up applying for asylum, as travel options might be limited or 
predetermined by existing trafficking routes and forced migrants might be 
under great time pressure to leave their country which does not give them 
sufficient time to weigh their options, other asylum seekers will have more 
time and the ability to choose where to apply for asylum. The data 
analysed here suggests that economic considerations do play a role when it 
comes to decisions about where to apply for asylum. When controlling for 
the other factors included in the model, one observes that asylum seekers 
apply in higher numbers in countries which offer greater employment 
opportunities. This will of course be true for economic migrants who use 
the asylum route in an attempt to circumvent the restrictive immigration 
regimes of developed countries. However, given the strength of the above 
correlation and the fact that almost 40 percent of all asylum seekers 
across OECD countries are awarded some protection status, we can 
reasonably interpret the above results in support of our expectation that 
labour market considerations also play a role in the considerations of 
forced migrants. Seeking physical security from persecution as well as 
economic opportunities in a country of destination can hardly be regarded 
as incompatible objectives for people forced to leave their country of origin. 
In contrast to the strong effect labour market factors, general economic 
growth appears to have no significant effect on the distribution of asylum 
seekers. Part of the reason for this might be that the OECD countries 
analysed here are all likely to be perceived as rich, economically thriving, 
industrialised countries. For new arrivals to benefit from the economic 
situation of a host-country, however, employment opportunities are 
regarded as more important than a country’s performance with regard to 




The existence of historical ties and established networks also comes out as 
highly significant. The number of people from the main countries of origin 
already resident in a particular host-country is strongly and positively 
correlated with the relative number of asylum applicants this country 
receives. This appears to support the suggestion that the existence of 
interpersonal ties, be it with relatives, friends or people from 'back home' 
already resident in a particular country of destination can act as a strong 
magnet for asylum seekers. This is not surprising as it is through such 
networks, information about the country of origin will be passed on to 
potential asylum seekers who are still in the country of origin. Despite the 
fact that qualitative studies suggest that the amount of information 
passed from relatives and friends from the destination country to potential 
asylum seekers before they leave is quite limited (Robinson and Segrott 
2002: 41),29 it appears that any kind of contact, no matter how fleeting will 
constitute a pull factor for potential asylum seekers that can tip the 
balance towards the decision to claim asylum in a particular country.  
 
Liberalism 
As expected, favourable perceptions as to how liberal a potential host-
country is, show a strong, and positive relationship with the relative 
numbers of applications that a country receives. Countries which show a 
high concern for people beyond their own border and engage 
disproportionately in efforts to alleviate underdevelopment in the third 
world (through ODA payments) attract relatively more asylum seekers 
(Thielemann 2003b).30  
 
                                                 
29 Robinson and Segrott's survey and interview data suggests a number of reasons for 
this limited degree of prior contacts—lack of time for those who had to flee at short 
notice, the dangers involved in risking that others might find out about their emigration 
plans and loss of contact due to internal flight conditions prior to their decision to leave 
their country (2002: 41). 
30 Other indicators such as number of racial attacks or number of extreme right wing 
votes in a country could be added as alternative indicators for the relative 'liberalness' of 
a country.  
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Distance 
Given the difficulties and costs involved in long-distance travel, we 
expected a negative relationship between the average distance of a host 
country from the principal countries of origin and that host-country’s 
asylum burden in any particular year. However, in our dataset of 20 
OECD countries, proximity as a pull factor does not produce any 
significant effect in the analysis. One might expect that the selection of 
host-countries analysed here will have influenced this result and that had 
we included host countries in the developing world, the results might have 
been different. However, the result might also be explained by the fact 
that an asylum seeker’s sense of security might increase, the further away 
they settle from the country in which they suffered persecution. Moreover, 
although one can usually observe established migration networks between 
neighbouring countries, the lack of other pull factors, e.g. economic ones, 
can constitute a disincentive for asylum seekers that might outweigh 
network factors.  
 
These findings mean that one has to refrain from generalising the results 
of single country case studies (like that by Holzer, Schneider and Widmer, 
2000) which strongly emphasise the importance of geographic proximity as 
a pull factor in the case of Switzerland. Clearly there are instances when 
geographic proximity does matter, especially when geographic pull factors 
interact with other pull factors such as existing historical ties (as was the 
case with refugees from former Yugoslavia fleeing to Germany or 
Switzerland in the 1990s). However, the broader analysis across time and 
space reveals that geographic factors are more limited in their effect than 
other pull factors.  
 
Deterrence 
The combined effects of deterrence measures, as shown in the deterrence 
index, comes out in the expected negative direction and does so at 
significant levels. The effect of policy-related factors, however, is not as  
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significant as that of historic and economic factors. Moreover, we find that 
the measures analysed appear to be quite short-term in their effect. When 
we lag the deterrence index by more than one year, it ceases to have any 
significance. Finally, if one disaggregates the measures included in the 
deterrence index (see Table 4), one finds that the index’s significance is 
due to the strong effect of only two of the five deterrence measures 
analysed here: (1) not allowing asylum seekers to work until their 
application has been successful or until they have been allowed to stay in 
the host-country more permanently on the basis of a subsidiary protection 
status (2) granting protection status to a smaller percentage of asylum 
seekers (in relation to the total number of applications) than other host-
states. Each of these two measures on its own is significant at the 0.05 
level. Their combined significance in the deterrence index is even stronger.  
 
 
Table 4: Impact of Individual Deterrence Measures 
 
Deterrence Measure Expected  Sign  Coef  Z 
  Prohibition to Work  -  -.4578465 -2.31** 
  Below Average Recognition Rate  -  -.2714122 -2.40** 
  Safe Third Country Provisions  -  -.1900568 -1.13 
  No Freedom of Movement  -  -.0748292 -0.30 
  Non-Cash Benefit Payments  -  -.1256857 -1.40 
N= 227; R-squared = 0.41; **p<0.05 
 
 
No significant effect in reducing asylum applications, however, could be 
found for the other three measures which have dominated the public 
policy debate on asylum in recent years. These are: (1) measures that 
allow states to turn asylum seekers back at their borders and return them 
to so-called ‘safe third countries’; (2) measures that deny asylum seekers 
freedom of movement within a host country, i.e. the introduction of 
dispersal schemes and (3) measures which have meant the end to cash 
benefit payments to asylum seekers, e.g. through the introduction of a 
voucher scheme. The following will provide some initial suggestions as to  
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how to explain the variation in effectiveness of these different measures.  
 
Discussion 
At the most general level, it seems clear that information about 
recognition rates and employment opportunities do reach asylum seekers 
either directly or indirectly through their agents and traffickers, whereas 
knowledge about more detailed policy measures is either not available to 
asylum seekers or not considered important enough to determine decisions 
regarding the choice of country of destination.  
 
The likelihood of asylum seekers receiving some kind of status that allows 
them to remain in their host country should they wish to do so, 
unsurprisingly is of the utmost importance. We have known for some time 
that that host countries interpret their international obligations under the 
Geneva Refugee Convention in very different ways (ECRE 2000)31 and 
that recognition rates can vary greatly between host countries at any 
particular time, even for asylum seekers from the same country of origin 
(Holzer and Schneider 2002: 43). Moreover, host countries have also dealt 
very differently with discretionary granting of subsidiary protection status 
to those asylum-seekers who do not qualify for refugee status but who host 
states feel cannot or should not be sent back to their country of origin 
(Thielemann 2003b). Even though asylum seekers will of course not have 
access to comparative league tables on which to base their decisions, 
information on whether or not other asylum seekers were allowed to 
remain in a host country can be expected to be carried back to agents, 
traffickers and other potential asylum seekers in the countries of origin. 
 
Given the high significance of employment opportunities as a pull factor 
for asylum seekers (see above), it is not surprising that a policy of not 
allowing asylum seekers to work until their application has been decided 
                                                 
31 The variation in countries' treatment of 'non-state agents of persecution' is a case in 
point.  
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upon (a process that in some countries can take several years) will act as 
an effective deterrence to those being in a position to choose in which 
country to lodge their application. Again this will not only be true for those 
applicants whose motives are primarily economic, but also for those who 
are fleeing persecution.  
 
One common problem behind the other three measures which might in 
part explain their limited effectiveness, is clearly the issue of how much 
knowledge about specific policy measures asylum seekers can be expected 
to possess. In addition, there are a number of more specific problems with 
such measures that will also contribute to their limited effectiveness. In 
the case of safe third country provisions, problems arise as a state which 
wants to send a potential actual asylum seeker back to another safe third 
country can only do so if it can establish at least part of the migrant’s 
transit route. Often this proves difficult as asylum seekers are either 
unable or unwilling (having been instructed by their agents) to provide 
such information. In particular with persons who apply for asylum only 
once they are already inside a country, that country can only hope for the 
cooperation of transit countries who might have already registered a 
person. Judging on past experiences, this type of cooperation is often not 
forthcoming. Despite efforts by the European Union to institutionalise 
such cooperation with the Schengen and Dublin Agreements and the joint 
EURODAC database, progress in this area has so far been limited (Noll 
2000). Cooperation with countries outside the EU is even more difficult as 
here the application of safe third country provisions requires special bi-
lateral or multi-lateral re-admission agreements. Therefore, the limited 
effect that safe third country provisions have had so far should not come 
as a surprise. Even in the case of the often quoted 71 percent drop in 
asylum applications in Germany from 1992 to 1994, which have generally 
been ascribed to the introduction of safe third country provisions with the 
1993 changes to the German Basic Law, few observers appear to be aware 
of the fact that this drop happened against a 53 percent drop in overall  
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applications across OECD countries and a 76 percent drop of applications 
from former Yugoslavia for which Germany had been the preferred 
country of destination in 1992, implying again the limits of policy based 
explanations. 
 
Regarding the remaining two measures—the denial of free movement and 
cash benefit payments—it is perhaps not surprising that these measures 
have not deterred asylum seekers in any significant numbers. The 
prospect of personal safety from persecution and a green card at the end of 
a successful determination procedure might make even the prospect a few 
months on non-cash benefits in say North Dakota just about bearable. The 
effectiveness of dispersal regimes is further reduced by the fact that, short 
of a general policy of detainment, there appears to be little a host-state 
can do to prevent the movement of those determined to join relatives or 
friends in other parts of the country. Even the policy of withdrawing 
housing and welfare assistance in such cases, as practised by some sates, 
has not always had the wanted deterrent effect.32 Finally, the role of cash 
benefits payments as a pull factor for asylum seekers has without doubt 
been greatly exaggerated in the media and by policy makers. Payments of 
benefits at a level that is often much less than the social assistance 
minimum will clearly be of limited attractiveness, in particular when 
many OECD countries have failed to effectively curtail illegal employment 
opportunities which promise vastly higher rewards. 
 
 
                                                 
32 Germany for example practises such a policy and has found it wanting in particular as 
asylum seekers assigned to some parts of Eastern Germany chose to forfeit assistance in 
the light of a disproportionately high incidence of racial violence in areas that until very 
recently had had very little experience with (non-white) foreigners.  This suggests that 
dispersal schemes sometimes have also failed to achieve their goal of decreasing local 
residents’ adverse reaction towards asylum seekers which is thought to result from the 




This article has shown that some of the most prominent public policy 
measures aimed at regulating unwanted migration and at addressing the 
very unequal distribution of asylum applications among OECD countries 
are less effective than has often been assumed. In addition to the often 
mentioned institutional constraints that policy makers are faced with in 
this area, this paper suggests four additional reasons:  
 
First, policy making in this area sometimes appears to exaggerate the 
degree of choice and the level of information that asylum seekers and their 
agents are assumed to have. The evidence presented here suggests that 
asylum seekers who are in a position to choose between a number of 
alternative host countries do so in a rational manner on the basis of some 
knowledge about the real or perceived differences between these states. 
However, we found little evidence for the claim that there is widespread 
and systematic ‘asylum shopping’ to exploit differences in host countries' 
welfare provisions. 
 
Second, the empirical analysis has shown, however, that the most 
powerful explanatory factors for an asylum seeker’s choice of host country 
are clearly not consideration of short-term welfare maximisation by the 
asylum seeker but legacies of migrant networks, employment 
opportunities and asylum seekers' perceptions about the relative 
'liberalness' of a particular host country, i.e. more 'structural' factors that, 
at least in the short and medium term, are beyond the reach of asylum 
policy makers. There are a number of plausible reasons why it might not 
be greatly surprising that individual deterrence measures will be 
overshadowed by these other pull factors. Ties with friends or family are 
likely to prove very strong even in the face of a country's not so welcoming 
asylum regime. Moreover, path-dependent processes can be expected to 
play strong roles because of the sunk costs involved in the creation of  
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forced migration networks. Restrictive immigration control policies create 
a profitable niche market for those exploiting the black market of 
international migration. Organised trafficking gangs and individual 
'entrepreneurs' provide a range of services to migrants for which they are 
able to charge often extortionate fees.33 Networks between these 
traffickers, agents, potential migrants and legal residents or citizens of 
destination countries are costly to build and are unlikely to be given up 
lightly. In a similar vein, a country's liberal reputation, which will have 
emerged over decades, is also unlikely to be called into question 
overnight.34  
 
Third, as states tend to copy deterrence measures introduced by other 
states, the desired impact of such attempts by one state to make its 
asylum policy more restrictive relative to other potential host countries, is 
often limited to a very short-term first mover advantage. The rapid spread 
of 'safe third country' provisions across Europe in the 1990s (Thielemann 
2003a), is perhaps the most prominent recent example of such processes of 
cross-country policy transfer which have become very common in this 
area.  
 
Finally, the effectiveness of unilateral policy measures will therefore be 
further undermined by multilateral efforts of international policy 
harmonisation. Given the structural character of many of the pull factors 
identified above, we can expect attempts to harmonise asylum rules across 
receiving countries, such as those currently developed by the European 
Union, to consolidate rather than effectively address existing disparities in 
                                                 
33 According to IOM figures, fees for services such as the smuggling across borders, 
arranging forged documents and visas, organising employment and lodging range from 
several hundred to over 30.000 US dollars depending on which country of origin and 
which host country are involved and it is estimated that more than 70 percent of asylum 
seekers make use of such services. .  
34 In interviews, asylum seekers in the UK regularly mention the UK's long-standing 
democratic tradition as one of the factors that attracted them to Britain (Robinson and 
Segrott 2002)—a reputation that the introduction of a voucher scheme is unlikely to 
challenge.    
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the distribution of asylum burdens. This means that initiatives in which 
policy makers have placed great hope in their attempt to overcome the 
ineptitude of unilateral efforts to steer migration flows might not only be 
ineffective, but indeed counterproductive, in addressing the problem of 
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